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Introduction: NASA’s Desert Research and 
Technology Studies (D-RATS) field test is one of 
several analog tests that NASA conducts each year to 
combine operations development, technology advances 
and science under planetary surface conditions [1]. The 
D-RATS focus is testing preliminary operational 
concepts for extravehicular activity (EVA) systems in 
the field using simulated surface operations and EVA 
hardware and procedures. For 2010 hardware included 
the Space Exploration Vehicles, Habitat Demonstration 
Units, Tri-ATHLETE, and a suite of new geology 
sample collection tools, including a self-contained 
GeoLab glove box for conducting in-field analysis of 
various collected rock samples. The D-RATS activities 
develop technical skills and experience for the mission 
planners, engineers, scientists, technicians, and 
astronauts responsible for realizing the goals of 
exploring planetary surfaces. 
The science community has had success with two 
distinctly different models for human-in-the-loop 
remote field experience. On one hand is the Apollo 
back-room experience, where trained geologists were 
required to rapidly assimilate data and communicate 
real-time instructions to astronauts interacting with the 
geological environment. In this environment, the back 
room decisions had immediate implications. The 
scientists involved in this process also had the benefit 
of knowing that tens to hundreds of kilograms of rock 
samples were to be returned to round out the in situ 
observations. At the other extreme, the MER mission 
has been conducted entirely robotically with significant 
time delays. Similarities to Apollo include the fact that 
only a single individual conveys the instructions to the 
rovers, and prior to that only a small subset of the team 
interacts to create the observational plan for a specific 
period of time. Unlike Apollo, this small team changes 
daily, but familiarity among team members and with 
the rovers eventually paralleled the Apollo experience 
[2]. In addition, significant field methodology 
differences were developed for MER because the data 
are relayed to the science team several times per day 
and they have many hours or even days to pore over 
the data and decide on a plan of action.  
Going forward, it is logical to assume that future 
remote field protocols will use elements from both 
experiences. For long-duration and outpost-type lunar 
missions, some degree of crew autonomy will have to 
be the case, where humans may only be in the loop 
once per day. At the same time, the opportunity to have 
a remote team of experts involved in real time science 
decisions provides significant benefits. There will 
probably be returned samples, but these may be 
considerably more limited than the mass of the Apollo 
era, so sampling decisions may be crucial. Our current 
knowledge of robotic traversing is the baseline that 
provides realistic expectations for future sample 
characterization and return, which may well be more 
limited than our Apollo experience. In every case, 
human EVA time is a critical resource that must be 
effectively planned. 
The Apollo Model: In 2008, D-RATS invited a 
science team to integrate science operations into field 
tests. The science team provided geological context 
and traverse protocols for the surface activities. The 
role of science was expanded in the D-RATS 2009 
analog exercise, significantly advancing science 
operations concepts using a science team, or 
backroom, based on the Apollo model. The science 
backroom role was to understand and support traverse 
activities in real time, using suit-mounted and rover-
based video streams and data. This model emphasized 
the need for scientists to analyze and interpret 
information on timescales that are unusually short 
(seconds to minutes) by remote sensing or robotic 
mission standards. This posed significant challenges 
for the science team, who struggled to keep up with the 
tactical operations of the crew and had little time to 
think strategically about the data being collected. 
Nonetheless, test metrics showed that real-time data 
return to the backroom allowed for both greatly 
improved field operations and scientific return. 
The MER Model: In 2010, the science backroom 
was significantly expanded and built on the Mars 
Exploration Rover (MER) model, where a tactical team 
worked with the D-RATS crew in real time during the 
day, then data and notes were “downlinked” to a 
strategic team in the evening. This model split the 
duties of data collection and data integration, which 
proved challenging in the 2009 test. Instead, the 
tactical team worked to help collect data and provided 
support to the crew, then made recommendations to the 
strategic team on what was likely to be important data. 
The strategic team interpreted the day’s activities in the 
context of overarching hypotheses for the geology of 
the region, identified areas of progress or outstanding 
questions, and re-planned subsequent day’s activities 
to converge on answers. This model had significant 
advantages in that it decreased individual workloads 
and increased the scientists’ ability to evaluate specific 
scientific hypotheses. However, this mode suffered at 
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each point where data and knowledge needed to be 
transferred, requiring significantly more data 
infrastructure (databases, notes, etc.) to function 
smoothly. 
Discussion: Two significant findings based on 
science backroom activities in both the Apollo-style 
(2009) and MER-style (2010) model involved (1) data 
management and flow; and (2) the significance of 
communication. 
Data management and flow. In the modern era of 
rapid data sharing and virtual presence, large science 
backroom operations with physically co-located 
personnel may be unnecessary. However, the large 
amount of real time data being generated to support the 
scientists needs an efficient and intuitive data plan that 
streamlines data flow. The MER database took years 
and many tools to develop. All spacecraft budget large 
sums for data pipelining for tactical use and the PDS 
for long-term storage, whereas Apollo did not. A real 
time mission with human involvement will produce 
significant amounts of data, and new examples of data 
such as voice transcripts also will need to be ingested 
and made available.  
One significant tension in both operational models 
occurs where the timescale of data acquisition is out of 
sync with the timescale for scientific understanding 
[e.g. 4]. There is a need to discuss strategic goals 
outside of the tactical timeline in order to evaluate 
accomplishments, identify outstanding questions, and 
re-plan activities. The lack of ability to pause the 
process was a significant issue during both models, 
though for different reasons. In the Apollo-style test, 
the backroom seats were usually overwhelmed trying 
to capture real time data from cameras and narrative. 
Breaks were, by necessity, short and staggered. 
Observations along the drive path between stations 
were crucial for establishing geologic setting and so 
were not appropriate times for intense discussion. 
There was no time during the traverse when all the 
science backroom stations were simultaneously free to 
discuss the traverse science.  
In the MER-style test, a strategic backroom 
function was specifically added to address this. The 
science backroom was divided into Tactical Science 
Operations Team (TSOT) and a Strategic Science 
Operations Team (SSOT). The SSOT worked after the 
tactical team to review science data acquired during the 
tactical process and replan based on the resulting 
science discussions. In practice, the SSOT spent 
significant time reviewing and piecing together data 
due to breakdowns in communication during the 
tactical process (discussed below). Additionally, the 
strategic science was conducted overnight, so that 
fatigue became a crucial factor in science efficiency. 
However, the SSOT did succeed in its goal to discuss 
science objectives in greater detail than was possible 
during the Apollo-style tactical-only mode. A future 
improvement might include providing a mini-
backroom to each station, helping capture the data and 
discussing it during that station’s natural breaks. That 
station would be armed with the consensus information 
for the benefit of the mission science lead.  
Communications. In both models, the science team 
relied on clear and complete communications from the 
crew, but fragmented communications was a serious 
tension point. The necessity of asking the crew to 
repeat lost information or hold still for another camera 
shot because the camera was out of focus the first time 
frequently annoyed the crew who perceived it as 
wasting their time. This tension point may be 
alleviated by aligning the actual communications 
ability with training of the crew and backroom to be 
comfortable within these data limits. Communications 
will also be streamlined with training of both crew and 
backroom [1]. Such training leads to smoother 
communications, competency and trust. Significant 
crew and backroom training has not been 
accomplishable within the limits of the D-RATS 
activity, but obviously intense geologic training of both 
crew and backroom will be necessary. Such training 
will allow the crew to be much more efficient in the 
field and drastically cut the desire for backroom 
coaching, freeing up time for evaluation. 
Lessons Learned: Lessons learned from both 
MER and Apollo models emphasize several common 
themes. Stable, high-fidelity communication and 
streamlined information access should be the standard 
for planetary geologic exploration, which requires 
investment in information tools and databases, and 
likely orbital communication satellites rather than 
relying on line-of-sight architectures. Having well-
trained geologists on the crew and on the science 
operations teams is probably the most important factor 
determining science return, but scientists in the 
backroom and on the ground must have tools and an 
architecture that allows sufficient time for scientific 
understanding. Finally, the continued collaboration 
between science, engineering and operations is crucial 
for future expeditions. 
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